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Correlate of Consciousness
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A few decades ago the search for the neuronal correlates of consciousness was
considered both technically intractable and philosophically questionable. Search-
ing for a material substrate of phenomena accessible only from the first-person
perspective  appeared to  be epistemically  problematic.  But  the development  of
non-invasive imaging technologies and the availability of intracranial recordings
from patients alleviated the imminent technical problems. Progress in the analysis
of the connectome of the brain, and the introduction of multisite recordings from
the cerebral cortex of animals led to a revision of concepts in the field of cognitive
neuroscience, emphasizing principles of distributed processing in recurrent net-
works  with  non-linear  dynamics,  self-organization,  and  coding  in  high-dimen-
sional-state space. These advances, together with the growing evidence for epi-
genetic shaping of brain functions by socio-cultural influences, pave the way for
novel theories that attempt to bridge the gap between neuronal processes and
subjective states. 
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1 Introduction
Progress in brain research, especially in the do-
main of cognitive neuroscience, renders phenom-
ena that have traditionally been subjects of the
humanities amenable to scientific investigation.
It has now become possible to investigate the
neuronal  underpinnings  of  mental  phenomena
such as perception, decision making, control of
attention, language perception and production,
action planning, storage and recall of memories,
emotions and moods, desires and aversions, and
last but not least consciousness. This research
agenda is confronted with a number of fascinat-
ing challenges. One is the immense complexity
of  the  brain  processes  that  underlie  these
highly-differentiated  cognitive  functions.  An-
other  results  from the fact  that  many of  the
phenomena whose neuronal correlates are to be
investigated are subjective phenomena, access-
ible  and  describable  only  from  a  first-person
perspective.  Hence  there  is  an  epistemically
problematic  gap  between  what  is  observable
from the  third-person  perspective  of  scientific
inquiry  and  the  explananda  that  need  to  be
defined in terms of first-person experience. Yet
another challenge is that a relatively young sci-
entific discipline is set to enter territories that
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for  millennia  have  been  ploughed  by  great
minds who have coined terms, formulated con-
cepts, and constructed belief systems based on
evidence extracted from introspection, intuition,
and observations that relied exclusively on the
natural senses. This raises numerous and on oc-
casions frustrating problems for communication,
because bridges have yet  to be built  between
the more recent naturalistic description systems
and  the  highly-differentiated  terminology  nur-
tured in the humanities. Some of these problems
surface in passionate discussions on the exist-
ence of free will, the nature of perception, the
constitution of the Self, and intentionality and
mental causation—and above all  on the ques-
tion of whether it is  even possible to identify
neuronal  correlates  of  mental,  subjective  phe-
nomena. 
In  this  chapter  some of  these  challenges
will  be  discussed  from  a  neurobiological  per-
spective. We shall first review the state of the
art in the field of  cognitive neuroscience,  em-
phasizing  recent  changes  in  our  views  on  the
brain. These have been forced upon us by the
novel data produced by new and powerful tech-
nologies. These insights show the brain to be a
highly distributed, self-active system with non-
linear dynamics; rather than a hierarchically-or-
ganized stimulus-response machine, as has been
proposed  by  behaviourist  theories.  Sub-
sequently, an excursion will be made into epi-
stemology,  to  establish  the  extent  to  which
brain  research  can contribute  to  philosophical
discussions concerning the nature of perception.
The process of perceiving will be interpreted as
a constructive act in which sparse sensory sig-
nals are matched with a huge amount of stored
knowledge;  and  the  various  sources  of  this
knowledge will  be discussed.  This  section will
set the stage for the following discussion of the
putative  neuronal  correlates  of  consciousness
(NCC),  as  it  will  highlight the cognitive con-
straints and idiosyncrasies of cognitive systems
that  owe  their  abilities  to  evolutionary  pro-
cesses. Before reviewing various theories on the
NCC, an attempt will be made to define the ex-
planandum—in full awareness of the futility of
this attempt. The review of experimental work
in search of the NCC will be followed by a brief
account of our own experimental contributions,
and then an attempt will be made to demystify
the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness—
the problem of  finding a naturalistic  explana-
tion  for  the  qualia,  namely  these  immaterial
connotations  of  our  experiences.  My  proposal
will be that the problem can be alleviated if we
consider not only individual brains and biolo-
gical evolution but also cultural evolution and
the social realities that have emerged from so-
cio-cultural interaction between human beings.
As this contribution addresses an interdis-
ciplinary audience I considered it appropriate to
not only refer to published work when alluding
to  experimental  findings  and  concepts  but  to
sometimes  provide  explicit  and detailed  back-
ground information. To this end I have adapted
passages from a few of my own publications, in
which I had addressed some of the issues that
needed to be recapitulated for the sake of clar-
ity in the present contribution. These passages
include  descriptions  of  experimental  findings
from my lab and descriptions of the state of the
art in the neurosciences. 
2 The state of the art in cognitive 
neuroscience: A paradigm shift
2.1 Classical views 
As detailed in several previous reviews the neur-
osciences are about to undergo a paradigm shift
towards concepts that consider the brain as a
self-organizing complex system with non-linear
dynamics that exploits a huge body of stored
knowledge to interpret sensory signals,  formu-
late hypotheses and to generate predictive mod-
els of the world in order to optimize adapted
behavioral  responses  (Singer 2009,  2013).  For
many decades, the search for the neuronal un-
derpinnings of cognitive and executive functions
has been guided by the behaviourist view that
the  brain is  essentially  a  highly  complex and
versatile  stimulus-response  machine,  in  which
serial processing strategies prevail. This view re-
ceived  further  support  from  early  anatomical
data that emphasized that feed-forward connec-
tions  exhibit  high  topographic  precision  and
possess strong driving synapses, while feedback
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connections  are  diffuse  and  only  modulatory.
The rather impressive performance of artificial
pattern-recognition systems based on such pro-
cessing architectures suggested that neuroscient-
ists were on the correct path. Accordingly, they
set  out  to  study  the  responses  of  neurons  to
sensory stimulations across the various stages of
the  processing  hierarchy  and  analyzed  activa-
tion  patterns  associated  with  motor  output,
hoping  that  these  strategies  would  eventually
lead  to  reductionist  explanations  of  the  neur-
onal  mechanisms  that  support  cognition,
memory, decision making, planning, and motor
behaviour.  The  strategy  to  follow  the  trans-
formation of activity from the sensory surfaces
over the numerous levels of hierarchically-organ-
ized processing structures to the respective ef-
fector  organs  proved to be  extremely  fruitful.
Comparison  of  brains  from  different  species
provided  compelling  evidence  that  the  basic
principles according to which neurons function
and  exchange  signals  have  been  preserved
throughout evolution with only minor modifica-
tions. For the comparatively simple nervous sys-
tems of certain invertebrates, this behaviourist
approach allowed for near-complete descriptions
of the neuronal mechanisms underlying particu-
lar  behavioural  manifestations.  This  nurtured
the  expectation  that  pursuing  this  research
strategy would sooner or later allow us to ex-
plain in the same way the more complex beha-
viour  of  mammals—and  ultimately  also  the
highly-differentiated cognitive functions of prim-
ates  and  human  subjects.  However,  in  recent
decades the pursuit of this approach has led to
an accumulation of evidence that demands a re-
vision of the classical hypothesis, which emphas-
izes serial feed-forward processing of sensory in-
formation within hierarchically-organized archi-
tectures.
2.2 Observations forcing an extension of 
classical views
Advances in the analysis of the cortical connec-
tome,  the  introduction  of  multisite  recording
techniques,  and  the  development  of  imaging
methods  assessing  whole-brain  activity  have
generated data that necessitate an extension of
classical views, raise novel questions, and likely
provide new solutions to old problems. 
Anatomical evidence: i) Within processing
streams from sensory surfaces to executive or-
gans, feedback projections are in general more
numerous  than  feed-forward  projections,  em-
phasizing  the  importance  of  top-down control
(Felleman &  van Essen 1991). ii)  Connections
linking  neurons  within  distinct  cortical  areas
cross the boundaries between areas (Schwarz &
Bolz 1991). Thus, the cerebral cortex appears to
be a continuously coupled sheet,  the different
cortical  areas  being  distinguished  mainly  by
their  input  and output  connections.  iii)  From
primary  sensory  areas  onwards,  processing
streams  diverge  into  numerous  parallel  path-
ways whose nodes are linked by massive recip-
rocal connections, both within and across mod-
alities (Markov & Kennedy 2013; Markov et al.
2013).  iv)  The rule  that  feed-forward connec-
tions originate in  supra-  and feedback projec-
tions in infragranular layers does not hold for
nearby cortical areas (Markov & Kennedy 2013;
Markov et  al. 2013).  Together  with  electro-
physiological evidence (De Pasquale & Sherman
2011),  this  threatens  the  strict  distinction
between  feed-forward  driving  and  feedback
modulatory  connections.  v)  Finally,  statistical
analysis  of  interareal  connectivity  suggests  an
organisation  resembling  small-world,  rich-club
networks (see  Van den Heuvel &  Sporns 2013)
that  minimize  path  length  between  nodes
(areas;  Van den Heuvel & Sporns 2011; Sporns
2013). However, analysis of projections with cel-
lular resolution suggests as one reason for short
path length the surprisingly high degree of con-
nectedness among cortical areas. Statistical ana-
lysis suggests that more than 60% of possible
links between network nodes are actually real-
ized (Markov & Kennedy 2013).
Functional evidence: i) Even in early sens-
ory areas neurons lose their simple feature-spe-
cific  responses  when  challenged  with  complex
stimuli  (David et  al. 2004;  Vinje &  Gallant
2000).  Moreover,  responses  are  influenced  by
stimuli in other modalities, by attention, reward
expectation, and contents in working memory,
thus suggesting contextual modulation not only
by intrinsic  connections but also  by top-down
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projections  (Engel et  al. 2001;  Calvert et  al.
1997;  Iurilli et al. 2012;  Muckli &  Petro 2013;
Stokes et  al. 2013).  ii)  The notion of  strictly
serial processing from input layer four, via lay-
ers three and two, to the output layers five and
six of the cerebral cortex needs to be revised in
light  of  evidence  that  vigorous  responses  can
also be elicited by sensory input when parts of
this  canonical  circuit  are  disrupted  (Con-
stantinople & Bruno 2013). The possibility that
supra and infragranular compartments can op-
erate in parallel  is  further supported by evid-
ence that the two subdivisions engage in oscil-
latory  activity  in  different  frequency  bands
(gamma in supra- and alpha or beta in infra-
granular layers;  Buffalo et al. 2011;  Roopun et
al. 2008. iii) Multisite recordings indicate that
“spontaneous”  fluctuations  in  the  responsive-
ness of individual neurons are often the reflec-
tion  of  coordinated,  highly  structured  spatio-
temporal activity patterns rather than the res-
ult  of  noise  (Kenet et  al. 2003;  Fries et  al.
2001a). iv) Widely distributed cortical areas ex-
hibit coherent fluctuations of their spontaneous
activity,  forming functionally-coupled networks
that change in their composition in a state-de-
pendent way (Fox et al. 2005; Hipp et al. 2012;
Raichle 2011;  Raichle et  al. 2001).  Thus,  the
cortex—and  in  a  wider  sense  the  brain—ap-
pears to be a highly active, pattern-generating
system,  rather  than  just  a  stimulus-driven
device. v) Analysis of whole brain activity with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and electroencephalographic (EEG) and magne-
toencephalographic (MEG) measurements indic-
ates  that  virtually  all  cognitive  and executive
functions are associated with the activation of
networks  of  often  widely-distributed  cortical
areas (Engen & Singer 2013; Friederici & Gier-
han 2013; Hipp et al. 2011; Hodzic et al. 2009;
Power & Petersen 2013). This suggests that dis-
tributed networks are a substrate of functions
rather than individual specialized structures. vi)
Finally, analysis of the brain’s dynamic signa-
tures  indicates  that  neuronal  populations  can
engage  in  oscillatory  activity  in  characteristic
frequency  bands  and  synchronize  their  dis-
charges,  such  that  the  respective  frequency
bands and the composition of coherently active
cell groups depend on central states, attention,
cognitive  tasks,  and  goals  of  action  (Buzsáki
2006; Singer 2010).
These  novel  anatomical  and  functional
data suggest as a prevailing organizational prin-
ciple distributed processing in densely coupled,
recurrent  networks  with  non-linear  dynamics,
which  are  capable  of  supporting  high  dimen-
sional states. This organization requires a high
degree of coordination of distributed processes,
suggesting that special  mechanisms are imple-
mented to dynamically bind local processes into
coherent  global  states,  and to  configure  func-
tional networks “on the fly” in a context- and
goal-dependent  way.  It  has  also  become clear
that the brain is by no means a stimulus-driven
system.  Rather,  it  is  self-active,  permanently
generating  highly  structured,  high-dimensional
spatio-temporal  activity  patterns.  These  pat-
terns are far from being random, and instead
seem to reflect the specificities of the functional
architecture that is determined by genes, modi-
fied by experience throughout post-natal devel-
opment, and further shaped by learning. These
self-generated activity patterns in turn seem to
serve as priors with which incoming sensory sig-
nals  are  compared.  Perception  is  now  under-
stood  as  an  active,  reconstructive  process,  in
which self-generated expectancies are compared
with incoming sensory signals. The development
of methods that allow simultaneous registration
of the activity of large numbers of spatially-dis-
tributed neurons revealed a mind-boggling com-
plexity of interaction dynamics—which in turn
eludes  the  capacity  of  conventional  analytical
tools  and,  because  of  its  non-linearity,  chal-
lenges hypotheses derived from intuition. 
In the last decade theoreticians have be-
gun  to  explore  and  appreciate  the  immense
computational power of such self-organizing re-
current networks that gave rise to concepts such
as  “reservoir  computing”,  “echo-state  comput-
ing”  or  “liquid  computing”  (Buonomano &
Maass 2009;  Lukoševičius &  Jaeger 2009). The
evidence  that  resting-state  activity  is  highly
structured, that information is contained in the
spatio-temporal relations between the responses
of widely distributed neurons, and that stimu-
lus-response functions depend crucially on state
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variables generated within the brain are in prin-
ciple compatible with such advanced concepts of
information  processing  in  highly  non-linear,
high-dimensional dynamic systems; but neurobi-
ological  approaches  taking  such considerations
into account are still very rare. 
2.3 Persisting explanatory gaps 
Our rather detailed knowledge of the response
properties  of  individual  neurons  in  different
brain structures, and of the microcircuits that
shape these responses, stands in stark contrast
to our ignorance of the complex and highly dy-
namic processes through which the myriads of
spatially-distributed neurons interact in order to
produce specific behaviours. Evidence from in-
vasive and non-invasive multi-site recordings in-
dicates that most higher brain functions result
from the coordinated interaction of large num-
bers of neurons, which become associated in a
context-  and  goal-dependent  way  into  ad-hoc
formed functional networks. These networks are
dynamically configured on the backbone of the
anatomical connections (for review see  von der
Malsburg et al. 2010). Evidence also indicates
that  these  interactions  give  rise  to  extremely
complex spatio-temporal patterns that are char-
acterized by oscillations in  a large  number of
different frequency bands, which can synchron-
ize,  exhibit  phase  shifts,  and  even  cross  fre-
quency coupling (Uhlhaas et al. 2009). In the
light of these novel data, the brain—and in par-
ticular the neocortex—appears to be a self-act-
ive, self-organizing “complex system” which ex-
hibits non-linear dynamics, is capable of utiliz-
ing multiple dimensions for coding (space, amp-
litude, oscillation frequency, and phase),  oper-
ates in a tightly-controlled range of self-organ-
ized criticality (Shew et al. 2009; edge of chaos),
and  constantly  generates  highly-structured,
high-dimensional  activity  patterns  that  are
likely to represent stored information. However,
how exactly information is encoded in the tra-
jectories of these high-dimensional and non-sta-
tionary time series is  largely unknown, and is
the  subject  of  increasingly  intense  research.
Moreover, with the exception of a few studies in
which selective manipulation of the activity of
defined neuron groups were shown to affect be-
haviour  in  a  particular  way  (Salzman et  al.
1992;  Houweling &  Brecht 2008;  Han et  al.
2011) most of the available evidence on the rela-
tions between neuronal responses and behaviour
is still correlative in nature. This makes it diffi-
cult to determine whether an observed variable
is  an  epiphenomenon  of  a  hidden  underlying
process or is causally involved in accomplishing
a  particular  function.  Thus,  systems  neuros-
cience  now faces  the  tremendous  challenge  of
analyzing the principles of distributed dynamic
coding and of obtaining causal evidence for the
functional role of specific activation patterns, in
order to distinguish between functionally-relev-
ant variables and epiphenomena.
In  conclusion,  we have  to  abandon clas-
sical notions of the neuronal representation of
perceptual objects and, in the same vein, that
of motor commands. The consequence is that it
becomes once again unclear how the distributed
processes that deal with the various properties
of a perceptual object—its visual, haptic, acous-
tic, olfactory and gustatory features—are bound
together in order to give rise to a coherent rep-
resentation or percept. Given this, it may ap-
pear more than bold to attempt to identify the
neuronal  correlates  of  consciousness—probably
the highest and most mysterious of our cognit-
ive functions. 
2.4 What neuroscientists believe
Despite the numerous gaps in our understand-
ing  of  integrated  brain  functions,  neurobiolo-
gists agree on a number of general conclusions
on the relation between brain processes and be-
havioural phenomena. The majority of neurobi-
ologists seem to consent that all cognitive and
executive functions that we can observe in hu-
man beings, including the highest mental activ-
ities and consciousness, are the result, not the
cause, of neural interactions. Consequently, it is
held that mental phenomena follow or emerge
from  neural  interactions  and  do  not  precede
them. Furthermore, it is assumed that all neural
processes obey the known laws of nature. The
reason for this is that the behaviour of organ-
isms of  low complexity,  such as,  for  example,
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molluscs or worms, can be fully explained by re-
gistering the activity of their neurons and estab-
lishing causal relations between the spatio-tem-
poral patterns of this activity and the respective
behaviour. There is, at present, no need to pos-
tulate any additional unknown forces, laws, or
modes of interaction in order to explain their
behaviour. The reason for this is that evolution
is a very conservative process. Once an inven-
tion  has  been  made  that  increases  fitness  it
tends to be conserved, unless there is a major
change in conditions that makes this invention
obsolete  or  maladapted.  Therefore,  our  nerve
cells function in exactly the same way as those
of  snails.  Likewise,  the  development  of  struc-
tures  also  follows  a  very  conservative  path.
Since the first appearance of the cerebral cor-
tex, the six-layered sheet of nerve cells that cov-
ers the hemispheres of the brain, no new struc-
tures have emerged. There is just more of the
same, and this increase in complexity marks the
difference between the brain of a human being
and that of our nearest neighbours,  the great
apes. Apparently, this processing substrate and
the associated gain of complexity marks the dif-
ference  difference  between  species  that  failed
and those that succeeded in promoting cultural
evolution—with  all  its  far  reaching  con-
sequences. In this context, however, one needs
to consider that cultural evolution created a so-
cio-cultural environment of ever-increasing com-
plexity that in turn contributes to the epigen-
etic shaping of brain architectures. Thus, even if
the genetically-determined layout of brain archi-
tectures has changed little since the beginning
of human civilisation, those features that can be
modified  by  epigenetic  shaping  are  likely  to
have undergone major modifications. This fact
has not always been taken into account in the
past; but its implications will be discussed be-
low. But this additional twist concerns the epi-
genetic modifiability of our brains, and not its
basic functional principles. 
3 Contributions of neuroscience to 
philosophy
Once the neurosciences began to investigate the
neuronal underpinnings of higher cognitive func-
tions, especially those realized in human brains,
an increasing number of questions, traditionally
investigated by the humanities, were addressed
through empirical studies within the rapidly de-
veloping field of cognitive neuroscience. One ob-
vious domain for this investigation was epistem-
ology.  Cognitive  neuroscience  explores  from a
third-person  perspective  the  mechanisms  that
mediate our perception and the acquisition of
knowledge. Longstanding discussions about the
objectivity  of  cognition,  the  question  of  how
constructive our perceptual processes really are,
and how reliable or idiosyncratic they might be,
need to be reconsidered on the basis of neurobi-
ological  data.  Another  question,  to  which the
neurosciences will have to find an answer, is re-
lated to the mind-body problem: how can men-
tal phenomena, namely immaterial entities such
as the qualia of perception and social realities
such as belief and value systems, emerge from
the material interactions between nerve cells in
human  brains?  These  immaterial  phenomena
came into this world once the cognitive abilities
of Homo sapiens initiated the evolution of cul-
tures. They affect our lives as much as the ma-
terial  constraints  of  the  world  in  which  we
evolve,  but  they  have  a  different  ontological
status to the neuronal processes that brought
them  into  this  world.  Yet  another  question
that solicits discussion between neuroscientists
and philosophers of mind is the nature of con-
sciousness. The question of the constitution of
the intentional Self is closely related to this is-
sue,  as  is  the conundrum of  the existence  of
Free  Will.  If  the  material  processes  in  indi-
vidual brains and the social realities resulting
from the interactions of humans are the basis
and cause of mental phenomena, and if brain
processes follow the known laws of nature, then
there ought to be unifying description systems
that  bridge  the  gap  between  phenomena  as-
sessed  from  third-  and  first-person  perspect-
ives. If such approaches turn out to be feasible
philosophical  positions,  the  postulation  of  an
ontological  dualism will  have to be modified.
This  will  have  far-reaching  consequences  for
our  self-understanding  and the  delineation  of
the border between “physics” and “metaphys-
ics”.
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3.1 An epistemic caveat
It is obvious that our perceptions and imagina-
tions, as well as our ability to reason, are con-
strained by the cognitive abilities of our brains
—and  brains,  like  all  other  organs,  are  the
product of an evolutionary process. Hence our
brains have become adapted to the conditions
of  the  mesoscopic  world  in  which  life  has
evolved. This is  the world within the scale of
millimeters to meters, it is the world where the
laws of  classical  physics  prevail;  it  is  not  the
world  of  quantum  physics  and  it  is  not  the
world  of  astrophysics.  As  a  consequence,  our
cognitive functions have become adjusted to as-
sure survival in this mesoscopic world. Problem-
solving in this dangerous and poorly-predictable
world  requires  the  application  of  pragmatic
heuristics and hence cognitive abilities that are
in all  likelihood not optimized to comprehend
the essence behind the perceivable phenomena
or the “absolute truth” in the Kantian sense.
Evolution did not  prepare  us to directly  per-
ceive and understand processes at subatomic or
cosmic scales, because they were and are com-
pletely irrelevant for our daily struggle for sur-
vival. Even more worrying is the possibility that
the way in which we reason may also be limited
by adaptation to those processes in the narrow
range of the world that are relevant for survival
and that we can access with our highly select-
ive, specialized senses. In conclusion, it is very
likely  that  our  cognition  is  constrained.  And
this may apply not only to primary perception,
but also to our way of deriving inferences from
observables. If this were true it would pose un-
surmountable barriers to our attempts to under-
stand, just as it would challenge the consistency
of mathematical theories and logical deductions.
However, for these very reasons we have no way
of knowing whether this is the case. 
3.2 The contribution of neuroscience to 
epistemology
Growing insights into the neuronal mechanisms
underlying  perception provide  compelling sup-
port for constructivist positions and emphasize
the  epistemic caveats  formulated above. In the
light  of  neurobiological  evidence,  perceiving is
essentially a constructive process.  The sensory
categories, for example those according to which
we assign qualities to our experiences, are noth-
ing but the idiosyncratic consequence of the lay-
out of our sensory organs. These sample in a
highly selective way a narrow range of physico-
chemical signals, and this leads to the arbitrary
classification of electromagnetic radiation with
wavelengths between 400 to 700 nanometers as
light, because the photoreceptors in the eye are
sensitive  to  this  wavelength  range.  Radiations
with slightly longer wavelengths stimulate our
temperature receptors and we categorise the re-
spective  sensations  as  temperature.  A  similar
arbitrariness of  category boundaries is  observ-
able in other sensory domains. The definition of
perceptual objects, for example, is guided by a
set of Gestaltrules that our brains apply in or-
der to segment the spatio-temporal continuum
of sensory signals into distinct objects—and this
holds  true  for  all  sensory  modalities.  Objects
are identified as such if they are delineated by
spatial or temporal borders and exhibit some in-
trinsic coherence. This definition is appropriate
in the mesoscopic world, but it does not apply
to objects at atomic or subatomic scales. If we
had no  a priori  definition of the properties of
objects, we would not be able to distinguish ob-
jects, we would, for example, be unable to ex-
tract object-specific features from the continu-
ous two-dimensional brightness distribution that
cluttered scenes generate on the retina. 
It is now well established by experimental
evidence  that  the  sparse  sensory  signals
provided by our highly selective senses are inter-
preted  by  the  brain  on  the  basis  of  a  vast
amount of  a priori knowledge that is stored in
its own functional architecture. Our self-active
brains  permanently  formulate  knowledge  and
context-dependent expectancies, interpret sens-
ory signals as a function of these inferences, and
present the result of this constructive process to
the  workspace  of  consciousness.  Paradoxically,
we  perceive  the  world  around  us  as  coherent
even though our senses extract only a minute
fraction of the available signals. Much of what
we experience as actually perceived is read out
from memory and is the result of reconstruction
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and completion. This raises the question of the
origins of this knowledge.
3.3 The sources of a priori knowledge
It is commonly accepted that all the knowledge
a brain can possibly have, and the rules accord-
ing to which this knowledge is applied for the
interpretation of sensory signals and the execu-
tion of movements, reside in the functional ar-
chitecture  of  the  brain.  This  contradicts  the
analogy  frequently  drawn  between  computers
and brains. Computers have processors and sep-
arate memories for programmes and for data. In
the brain, however, there exist only neurons and
connections. Both the stored knowledge and the
programs for processing this knowledge reside in
the layout of these connections, their polarity—
that is, whether they are excitatory or inhibit-
ory—and their graded efficacy. The question of
the origin of stored information is thus reduced
to  the  question  of  which  processes  determine
the functional architecture of the brain. 
The  most  important  determinant  of  the
functional architecture of brain—and hence the
most  important  source  of  knowledge—is,  of
course, evolution. What makes our brain archi-
tectures comparable is evolutionary-acquired in-
formation that resides in the genes and determ-
ines the layout of the brain’s connectome. It is
knowledge about the world that is expressed in
the functional architecture of brains every time
an organism develops.  In  this  sense  evolution
can be considered a cognitive process. This evol-
utionary-acquired knowledge pertains essentially
to the conditions of the precultural world; and
it is implicit—we are not aware of having it be-
cause we were not around when it was acquired.
Still, we use it to interpret the signals provided
by our sense organs and to structure adapted
responses. 
This  inborn  knowledge  is  subsequently
complemented  by extensive  epigenetic  shaping
of the neuronal architectures, which adapt the
developing  brain  to  the  actual  conditions  in
which the individual develops. The human brain
develops  the  majority  of  its  connections  only
after birth, and this process continues approx-
imately until the age of twenty or twenty-five
years. During this developmental period numer-
ous new connections are formed, while many ex-
isting connections are removed; and this making
and breaking is guided by the neuronal activity
itself.  Since,  after  birth,  neuronal  activity  is
modulated  by  interactions  with  the  environ-
ment, the development of brain architectures is
thus determined by a host of epigenetic factors
derived  from  the  natural  and  social  environ-
ment. Through this process, the brain acquires
knowledge  about  the  specific  conditions  in
which the newborn organism actually evolves,
and thereby complements its genetically-inher-
ited knowledge. 
A considerable part of this development-
ally-acquired  knowledge  also  remains  implicit
because of the phenomenon of childhood amne-
sia. Children before the age of about four years
have  only  a  limited  capacity  to  remember  in
which context they have experienced and learnt
particular contents. The reason for this is that
the  brain  centres  required  for  these  storage
functions—we call them episodic or biographical
or declarative memories—have not yet matured.
Thus, while young children learn very efficiently
and store contents in a very robust way through
structural modifications of their brain architec-
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Figure  1:  The  brain  assumes  that  light  comes  from
above. The circular contours on the left board appear as
concavities because the shadows are located at the right
upper corner. The right board is actually the same as on
the left, just rotated by 180 degrees. Now the shadows are
on the lower left border and the contours appear convex.
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ture,  they  often  have  no  recollection  of  the
source of this knowledge. Because of this appar-
ent lack of causation, the knowledge acquired in
this way is implicit,  similarly to evolutionary-
acquired  knowledge,  and  therefore  often  as-
sumes the status of convictions that cannot be
questioned.
Like  innate  knowledge,  this  acquired
knowledge is used to shape cognitive processes
and to structure our perceptions. Yet we are not
aware that what we perceive is actually the res-
ult of such knowledge-based interpretations. 
Finally, there is knowledge acquisition by
learning, which accompanies us throughout our
lives.  This is  based on graded changes of  the
coupling  strength  of  the  existing  connections
between neurons.  In the adult  brain few new
connections are formed and under normal con-
ditions no breaking of connections occurs. The
knowledge acquired by these learning processes
also biases perception, but this is explicit, and
its origins are known. One is usually aware of
when and how it  has  been  acquired  and can
therefore question its validity and by the same
token the validity of what is perceived.
3.4 Examples illustrating the influence of 
priors on perception
The two examples depicted in figure 1 and fig-
ure 2 illustrate impressively how a priori know-
ledge structures  our primary perceptions.  The
object in  figure 1 is a mould used to produce
candies. On the left side one sees the inside of
the mould, with its concavities, and on the left
we see the rear side with its corresponding con-
vex  protrusions.  In  reality,  the  pictures  are
identical, but one is rotated by 180°. The reason
for our very different perceptions of the images
is that the brain makes the a priori assumption
that light comes from above—a well adapted as-
sumption in a precultural world with only nat-
ural  light  sources.  In  this  case  contours  that
have the shadow above are interpreted as con-
cave, and those with the shadow below as con-
vex. Thus, an assumption of which we are not
aware  determines  what  we  perceive.  Another
striking example is shown in figure 2. It is hard
to believe, but surfaces A and B have exactly
the same luminance. They appear different be-
cause the brain sees the shadow that is caused
by the cylinder on the right. Even though the
amount of light reflected from surfaces A and B
and impinging on the retina is exactly the same,
the brain interprets the brightness of  the two
surfaces as different because it infers the follow-
ing.  Given that  there  is  a  shadow,  surface  B
must be brighter than surface A—which has no
shadow  on  it—in  order  to  reflect  the  same
amount  of  light.  Thus,  the  brain  “computes”
the inferred brightness of the surfaces, but we
are not aware of these computations. We just
perceive the result and take it to be real, i.e.,
we see B as being much brighter than A. These
two examples indicate that the brain generates
inferences of which we are not aware, that it is
permanently reconstructing the world according
to a priori knowledge, and that we, as perceiv-
ing subjects, have to take for granted what the
system finally offers us as conscious experience.
As expected, this is not only the case with spe-
cially designed psycho-physical experiments, but
is an essential feature of all our perceptual pro-
cesses.
The mechanism leading to this “false” per-
ception, to this “illusion”, has of course an im-
portant function. Our brain uses this principle
to generate perceptual constancy, e.g., to keep
colours and contrasts constant despite different
illumination conditions.  The spectral  composi-
tion  and  the  intensity  of  the  sunlight  change
dramatically throughout the day, and therefore
the spectral mix of light reflected from a partic-
ular,  edible berry differs in the morning from
that at noon. An animal that relies on colour to
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Figure  2:  The checker-board illusion by Adelson, illus-
trating that even brightness  perception depends on as-
sumptions derived from context. (For further descriptions
see text.)
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distinguish  one  edible  berry  from  another,
slightly more violet and poisonous berry, cannot
rely on an analysis of the “true” or actual spec-
tral composition of reflected light. It first has to
assess  the  spectral  composition  of  the  light
source—the  sunlight—and  then  must  recon-
struct the perceived colour. Our brains accom-
plish this by assessing the actual lighting condi-
tions, by comparing the colours of the sky, of
stones, of leaves and barks etc. and then, by us-
ing  this  contextual  information,  compute  the
“real”  colour  of  the  berries  to  identify  that
which is edible. Our brains are capable of assur-
ing colour constancy despite changing illumina-
tion conditions, but we are completely unaware
of the complexity of the computations assuring
constancy and thereby survival  in  a  changing
world. In essence, all these operations are based
on the evaluation of  relations.  We rarely per-
ceive absolute values such as those measured by
physical  devices,  be  it  intensities  of  stimuli,
wave-lengths of sound or light waves, or chem-
ical  concentrations.  We  mostly  perceive  these
variables in relation to others, as differences, in-
crements and contrasts, such that these compar-
isons are made both across space and time. This
is a very economical and efficient strategy be-
cause it emphasizes differences,  permits cover-
age of wide ranges of intensities and, as men-
tioned above,  allows  for  constancy.  Given the
advantages of these well-adapted heuristics it is
at least questionable whether one should con-
front the resulting perceptions as illusions. 
3.5 Conclusion of the excursion into 
epistemology
Evolution-  and  experience-dependent  develop-
ment determine and shape the architecture of
the brain. Through these processes, knowledge
about the world and strategies to use this know-
ledge for survival and reproduction are imple-
mented in brain architectures. These in turn de-
termine  what and how an organism perceives
and how it behaves. Because of the selection cri-
teria that guides evolution, the brain adapted to
the narrow segment of the world in which life
has evolved, and its functions have been optim-
ized to extract and process those signals that
best serve survival and reproduction. Thus the
cognitive functions of the brain have probably
not  been  optimized  for  understanding  the
deeper structure of the world that assures co-
herence across scales and cannot be perceived
directly. Similarly, the rules according to which
we evaluate contingencies and establish associ-
ations among events are implemented by spe-
cific molecular mechanisms that translate tem-
poral correlations of neuronal activity into last-
ing changes in the efficacy of neuronal connec-
tions. These rules have been preserved virtually
unchanged  since  the  evolution  of  primitive
nervous systems, and are at the basis of assign-
ments of causality and the formation of associ-
ations. Again, these rules are highly efficient for
the  generation  of  models  of  the  mesoscopic
world and the formulation of  predictions,  but
they do not apply to processes in the quantum
world or to the relativistic dynamics of the uni-
verse.  Given these  specific  adaptations  of  our
cognitive  functions,  one  might  consider  that
similar restrictions may also hold for the way
we reason.  If  so,  this  would present a serious
challenge for the generalisation of  models and
theories based on extrapolation. 
4 The contribution of the neurosciences 
to theories of consciousness
Some of the propositions summarized in the fol-
lowing chapter have been derived from experi-
ments on the neuronal substrate of conscious-
ness that have been described in detail in Mel-
loni &  Singer (2011)  and  Aru  et  al. (2012a,
2012b). A few decades ago, attempts to identify
the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC)
were considered futile. Because of the rapid de-
velopment of non-invasive technology for the re-
gistration  of  neuronal  activity  in  the  human
brain, and because of advances in the analysis
of the neuronal underpinnings of higher cognit-
ive functions, the search for NCC has now be-
come a very active field of research in cognitive
neuroscience. As expected, this new field is con-
fronted with great challenges that are difficult
to  overcome.  The  explanandum  is  ill-defined;
the prerequisites and consequences of conscious
processing cannot easily be distinguished by ex-
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periment from conscious processing per se; the
experience  of  mental  causation  and agency  is
difficult  to  reconcile  with  contemporary  con-
cepts of self-organization; and finally it is diffi-
cult to bridge the epistemic gap between phe-
nomena that are experienced from a first-person
perspective  and mechanisms  described  from a
third-person  perspective.  Some of  these  prob-
lems will  be  addressed  in  the  following para-
graphs. 
4.1 An attempt to define the explanandum
Most  languages  have  coined  a  term  for  con-
sciousness.  Thus,  it  must  be  a  robust  phe-
nomenon  on  which  human  beings  can  agree.
However, while it is easy to use the term, it is
virtually impossible to give a formal definition
of what exactly it means. Nevertheless, the im-
plicit  understanding  of  what  it  is  to  be  con-
scious seems to be sufficiently clear and widely
accepted enough to justify a search for its neur-
onal correlates and, ultimately, to identify the
neuronal mechanisms that enable a subject to
be conscious of something. In their seminal pa-
per,  Crick &  Koch (1990)  propose  that  con-
sciousness  is  a  specific  cognitive  function  and
that, as such, it must have neuronal correlates
that can be analyzed with the tools of the nat-
ural sciences. With the development of non-in-
vasive  imaging  technologies,  the  tools  became
available to actually pursue this project and the
search for the neuronal correlates of conscious-
ness (NCC) became a mainstream endeavour.
Before  discussing  some  of  the  proposed
theories for NCC, I shall attempt to give an op-
erational definition of what I mean when refer-
ring to awareness and consciousness or, in other
terms, what it means to be aware of something
or to be conscious. Subjects will be considered
aware of something if  they are able to report
the presence or absence of the content of a cog-
nitive process—irrespective of whether this con-
tent  is  made  available  by  recall  from  stored
memories or drawn from actual sensory experi-
ence. Thus, one criterion for awareness is the re-
portability of the presence of a cognitive con-
tent. These reports can in principle consist of
any motor response, but to be on the safe side,
it is often requested that the report be verbal.
The  reason  for  this  is  that  behavioural  re-
sponses  can  be  obtained  under  forced  choice
conditions that clearly indicate that the brain
has  processed  and  recognized  the  respective
sensory  material  and  produced  a  correct  re-
sponse even though the subject may not have
been  aware  of  having  perceived  the  stimulus.
There  is  thus  an  inherent  ambiguity  in  non-
verbal responses. They can but need not neces-
sarily signal awareness, and this constrains re-
search  on  NCC in  animal  experiments.  Since
consciousness  is  so  difficult  to  define,  an  at-
tempt will be made to avoid this term. Instead
we shall use the adverb “consciously” and the
adjective “conscious” in order to further specify
particular brain states or aspects of a percep-
tual process. In addition, research into the hard
problem of consciousness (Chalmers 2000) con-
fronts  the  problem  of  explaining  the  phase
transition from neuronal processes to the qualia
of  subjective  experience,  but  this  will  be  dis-
cussed only briefly at the end of this paper—
and  there  in  an  enlarged  context  that  tran-
scends neurobiological approaches by also tak-
ing social interactions into account.
The state of being aware of something has
a number of distinct properties that constrain
the underlying neuronal mechanisms. One im-
portant feature of this state is unity or related-
ness: Contents of which one is aware are experi-
enced as simultaneously present and related to
each other. Because of the distributed organiza-
tion of brain processes, mechanisms supporting
phenomenal awareness must therefore be able to
bind together computational results obtained in
multiple specialized and widely distributed pro-
cessing areas.  Another feature of  awareness  is
that the contents that one is aware of change
continuously  but  are  bound together  in  time,
appearing as a seamless flow that is coherent in
space and time. Finally, subjects are only aware
of a small fraction of on-going cognitive opera-
tions.  Still,  even signals of which subjects are
not aware are often readily processed and im-
pact behaviour (Dehaene et al. 1998;  van Gaal
et al. 2008). Thus there must be gating mechan-
ism that determines which signals are processed
consciously, which are processed and control be-
Singer, W. (2015). The Ongoing Search for the Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 36(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570344 11 | 30
www.open-mind.net
haviour but remain unconscious, and which are
excluded from processing altogether. Therefore,
the identification of NCC requires a clear delin-
eation between subconscious and conscious pro-
cesses and an analysis of the mechanisms that
gate access to awareness.
4.2 Conscious versus subconscious 
processing
As mentioned above,  an  enormous  amount of
knowledge is stored in the specific architectures
of the brain, but we are not aware of most of
these “given” heuristics, assumptions, and con-
cepts. These routines determine the outcome of
cognitive processes, which often have access to
conscious recollection while themselves remain-
ing hidden in the unconscious. We cannot move
these implicit hypotheses and rules to the work-
space of consciousness by focusing our attention
on them, as is possible with most sensory sig-
nals and contents stored, for example, in “de-
clarative memory”—the memory in which is in-
scribed what has been consciously experienced.
Excluded  from  conscious  experience  are  also
certain sensory signals—such as those elicited,
for  example,  by  pheromones,  which  are  pro-
cessed by special olfactory subsystems—or the
many  signals  from within  the  body—such  as
messages  about  blood  pressures,  sugar  levels,
and  so  on.  It  cannot  be  emphasized  enough,
however, that signals that are permanently ex-
cluded from conscious processing, as well as the
facultatively-excluded signals from non-attended
sensory stimuli,  still  have a strong impact  on
behaviour. Moreover, by influencing attentional
mechanisms  they  can determine  which  of  the
stored  memories  or  sensory  signals  will  be
transferred to the level of conscious processing.
A hungry predator will search for traces of prey
rather than mating partners, and so on.
One reason for the gated access of cognit-
ive material to the level of awareness appears to
be the limited capacity of the workspace of con-
sciousness. Whether these limitations are due to
the inability to attend to large numbers of items
simultaneously, or whether they result from the
restricted capacity of working memory, or even
both, is  subject to intense scientific  investiga-
tion. The capacity of working memory is limited
to about four to seven different items. The phe-
nomenon of “change blindness”, which is the in-
ability  to  detect  local  changes  in  two  images
presented in quick succession, demonstrates im-
pressively our inability to attend to and con-
sciously process all features of an image simul-
taneously. Because of these capacity constraints,
conscious processing is in essence serial. Items
are scrutinized and compared serially and there-
fore  conscious  processing  is  slow.  Complex
visual scenes are scanned serially and much of
what we believe that we perceive simultaneously
is actually reconstructed from memory. Which
of  the  many signals  finally  reach the  level  of
conscious  awareness  and can then be  recalled
depends on whether they are attended to, and
this in turn is controlled either by external cues,
such as the saliency of a stimulus, or by internal
motifs, many of which we may actually not be
aware of. And then it may occur that even an
attentive, conscious search for content stored in
declarative memory fails to raise it to the level
of awareness. We are all familiar with the tem-
porary inability to remember an episode or a
name and have witnessed how a persisting sub-
conscious search process suddenly lifts the con-
tent into the workspace of consciousness. It ap-
pears that we are not capable of controlling, at
all times, which contents enter consciousness.
The  differences  between  conscious  and
subconscious  processes  are  further  emphasized
by evidence that the rules governing conscious
deliberations  and  decisions  most  likely  differ
from  those  of  subconscious  processes.  The
former  are  based  mainly  on  rational,  logical,
and syntactic rules, and the search for solutions
is essentially based on serial computations. Ar-
guments and facts are scrutinized one by one,
and  possible  outcomes  investigated.  This
strategy is suitable if variables are well defined,
if sufficient time is available, if problems have a
structure amenable to analytical treatment, and
if precise solutions are required. 
Subconscious  mechanisms,  by  contrast,
seem  to  rely  more  heavily  on  parallel  pro-
cessing,  whereby  a  large  number  of  variables
enter into competition with one another. Then,
a “winner takes all” algorithm leads to the sta-
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bilization  of  the  activity  pattern  that  is  the
most likely, given the initial conditions and the
heuristics derived either from inborn routines or
from past experience. The domains of subcon-
scious processing are  situations requiring very
fast responses or conditions where large num-
bers  of  underdetermined  variables  have  to  be
considered simultaneously, and weighed against
variables that have no or only limited access to
conscious processing—such as the wealth of im-
plicit knowledge and heuristics, vague feelings,
hidden motives, or drives. The outcome of such
subconscious processes manifests itself either in
immediate behavioural responses or in what is
called “gut feelings”. And it is often not possible
to indicate with rational argument why exactly
one has responded in such a way and why one
feels that something is wrong or right. In exper-
imental settings one can even demonstrate that
the rational  arguments given  for  or  against  a
particular  response  do  not  correspond  to  the
“real” causes. For the solution of complex prob-
lems with numerous entangled variables it often
turns out that the subconscious processes lead
to better solutions than conscious deliberations
—and  this  is  thought  to  be  because  of  the
wealth of heuristics exploitable by subconscious
processing. Given the large amount of informa-
tion and implicit knowledge to which conscious-
ness has no or only sporadic access, and given
the crucial importance of subconscious heurist-
ics for decision-making and guidance of  beha-
viour, first identifying the structure of a prob-
lem and then deciding whether one should rely
on conscious deliberations or listen to the voices
of the subconscious appears to be a well adap-
ted strategy.
However, because the two systems operate
according  to  different  principles,  the  solutions
to a particular problem may not always agree.
Most of the decisions that get us through daily
life rely on subconscious processing and follow
well-adapted  heuristics.  If  these  decision  pro-
cesses  do  not  lead  to  immediate  action,  they
may  still  influence  subsequent  behaviour  by
manifesting  themselves  as  what  we  call  “gut
feelings”.  One has no conscious recollection of
the reasons that lead to these feelings, but one
clearly  experiences  the  reactions  of  one’s
autonomous nervous system when the results of
subconscious processes are in conflict with the
outcome of conscious deliberations. In such situ-
ations one tends to say: “I decided according to
all the rational arguments that I was aware of
and took the best decision I could think of, but
it somehow feels wrong.” The opposite situation
is also possible, “I did what felt right to me, but
if I think about it, it is absolutely crazy and ir-
rational”. It is only when the two decision sys-
tems converge  on the  same solution  one  feels
good, satisfied, and to some extent “free”. 
After  this  brief  excursion  into  the  phe-
nomenology of conscious and subconscious pro-
cesses, intended to convey some connotations of
consciousness, some of the most popular hypo-
theses about the constitution of consciousness in
the brain will be reviewed.
4.3 Some competing hypotheses about 
the NCC 
One class of theories focuses on the philosoph-
ical  implications  of  the  hard  problem of  con-
sciousness  without  attempting  to  provide  de-
tailed descriptions of putative neuronal mechan-
isms  (Searle 1997;  Metzinger 2000;  Dennett
1992;  Chalmers 2000).  Solutions  to  the  hard
problem have  also  been  sought  through  tran-
scending current concepts of neuronal processes
and incorporating theories borrowed from other
scientific  disciplines.  The  most  prominent  of
these approaches assumes that phenomena un-
ravelled by quantum physics also play a role in
neuronal processes, and that they might be able
to account for the emergence of consciousness
from material interactions in the brain (Hamer-
off 2006; Penrose 1994). None of the predictions
of these theories are at present amenable to ex-
perimental  verification,  because  there  is  no
evidence that quantum phenomena such as en-
tanglement, superposition and collapse of wave
functions, etc., play a role at the macroscopic
level  of  neuronal  network functions.  Quantum
effects do of course exist at the level of molecu-
lar  and  submolecular  interactions,  but  it  ap-
pears highly unlikely that they are relevant for
the macroscopic  functions of  neurons respons-
ible for information processing. Thus quantum
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theories of consciousness attempt to explain one
poorly understood phenomenon with still unex-
plored  and  unproven  mechanisms,  and  will
therefore not be discussed further here. 
Another  class  of  theories  pursues  more
modest goals and attempts to examine neuronal
mechanisms  potentially  capable  of  supporting
awareness of cognitive contents. Their aim is to
define the neuronal mechanisms supporting the
unitary character of awareness, its coherence in
space and time, and the control of states that
distinguish between conscious and unconscious
processing (for review of relevant experimental
findings see  Melloni &  Singer 2011;  Aru et al.
2012a). 
The most intuitively plausible solution for
the unity of awareness is convergence of the res-
ults obtained in distributed processing areas to
a singular structure at the top of the processing
hierarchy. Theories derived from this intuition
predict the activation of specific cortical areas
when  subjects  are  aware  of  stimuli.  Con-
sequently, these regions should remain inactive
during unconscious processing of the same ma-
terial. Likewise, lesions of these putative areas
should abolish the ability to become aware of
perceptual objects.  So far,  a region with such
universal  “observer  functions”  has  not  been
identified, and this option is considered theoret-
ically  implausible  by  some  (Dennett 1992).
There is also little—if any—experimental evid-
ence for such a scenario. If brain lesions abolish
the  functions  of  sensory  areas  or  regions  in-
volved in the recall of memories, patients lose
the  ability  to  consciously  experience  the  re-
spective sensory contents or memories, but the
ability to process other material consciously re-
mains  unaffected.  Moreover,  behavioural  and
brain imaging studies have shown that uncon-
scious processing engages very much the same
areas  as  conscious  processing,  including  the
frontal and prefrontal cortices (Lau & Passing-
ham 2007; van Gaal et al. 2008). Thus there is
no compelling evidence for specific  areas sup-
porting conscious processing. The are prominent
examples of the selective elimination from con-
scious perception of those aspects of the stimu-
lus material  that  are processed in specific  re-
gions without affecting awareness of other con-
tents, such as syndromes of agnosia and blind-
sight (Cowey & Stoerig 1991), which result from
selective lesions of sensory subsystems. 
There are, however, systems and pathways
in the brain whose destruction abolishes all con-
scious  experience—but  these  cannot  be  con-
sidered to be the NCC. Rather, these systems
adjust the narrow dynamic range within which
the brain has to be kept in order to be opera-
tional and to perform the computations that ul-
timately give rise to awareness. These systems
are addressed as modulatory systems; they ori-
ginate mainly  in  deep structures  of  the brain
and control global brain states via widely-diver-
ging ascending projections. 
Another class of theories favours the no-
tion that the mechanisms supporting awareness
of stimulation material are distributed and do
not require anatomical convergence (Rodriguez
et al. 1999; Metzinger 2000; Varela et al. 2001).
Baars (1997) and Dehaene et al. (2006) propose
that  there  is  a  workspace  of  consciousness
whose neuronal correlate is a widely distributed
network  of  neurons  located  in  the  superficial
layers  of  the  cortical  mantel.  As  mentioned
above,  these  neurons  are  reciprocally  coupled
through a dense network of cortico-cortical con-
nections that have features of small-world net-
works.  The  proposal  is  that  subjects  become
aware of signals if these are sufficiently salient
to ignite coordinated activity within this work-
space of consciousness.  This is assumed to be
the case for signals that either have high sali-
ency because of the high physical energy of the
stimuli or those that are made salient due to at-
tentional selection. 
Yet another, related proposal is that sub-
jects become aware of contents, irrespective of
whether they are triggered by sensory events or
recalled  by  imagery  from stored  memories,  if
the  distributed  neurons  coding  these  contents
are organized into assemblies  characterized by
coherent,  temporally-structured  activity  pat-
terns. In this case, the critical state variable dis-
tinguishing  conscious  from  non-conscious  pro-
cessing would be the spatial extent and the pre-
cision  of  coherence  of  temporally-structured
neuronal responses (Rodriguez et al. 1999; Met-
zinger 2000; Varela et al. 2001). 
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In what follows, evidence will be reviewed
in  support  of  the  latter  hypothesis.  However,
before discussing this evidence we should briefly
recall  the  reasons  why  temporal  coherence
should matter in neuronal processing.
4.4 The formation of functional networks 
by temporal coordination
Because of the small-world architecture of the
cortical connectome, any neuron can communic-
ate with any other neuron either directly or via
just a few interposed nodes. Thus, efficient and
highly flexible mechanisms are required, which
permit  selective  routing  of  signals  and assure
that only the neurons that need to interact in
order to accomplish a particular task effectively
communicate with one another. Evidence from
multisite  invasive  recordings  and from non-in-
vasive  registration  of  global  activity  patterns
with  magneto-encephalography  or  functional
magnetic  resonance  imaging  indeed  indicates
that functional sub-networks are configured “on
the fly”  on the backbone of  fixed  anatomical
connections in a task- and goal-dependent way.
One mechanism that can accomplish such fast
and  selective  association  of  neurons  and  gate
neuronal interaction is the temporal coordina-
tion  of  oscillatory  activity  (Gray et  al. 1989;
Fries 2005). Since the discovery (Gray & Singer
1989) that spatially-distributed neurons in the
primary visual cortex tend to engage in oscillat-
ory responses in the beta and gamma frequency
band  when  activated  by  appropriately  con-
figured contours, and that these oscillatory re-
sponses  can  synchronize  over  large  distances
within and across cortical areas and even hemi-
spheres, numerous studies have confirmed that
oscillations and their synchronization in differ-
ent  frequency  bands  are  an  ubiquitous  phe-
nomenon in the  mammalian brain.  The pace-
makers of these oscillations are reciprocal inter-
actions in local networks of inhibitory and ex-
citatory neurons. The long-distance synchroniz-
ation of this oscillatory activity appears to be
achieved  by  several  mechanisms  operating  in
parallel:  Long-range  excitatory  cortico-cortical
connections,  long-range  inhibitory  projections,
and pathways ascending from nuclei in the thal-
amus and the basal forebrain (for a review of
these see  Uhlhaas et al. 2009). When neurons
engage in oscillatory activity, they pass through
alternating cycles of high and low excitability.
At the peak of an oscillation cycle neurons are
depolarized, highly susceptible to excitatory in-
put, and capable of emitting action potentials.
In the subsequent trough of the cycle, the mem-
brane  potential  is  hyperpolarized  and  mem-
brane  conductance  is  high  because  of  strong
GABAergic inhibition generated by the rhyth-
mically-active  inhibitory  interneurons.  During
this phase, neurons are less susceptible to excit-
atory  inputs,  because  excitatory  postsynaptic
potentials (EPSPs) are shunted and because the
membrane potential is  far from the threshold.
Hence, neurons are unlikely to respond to pre-
synaptic excitatory drive. 
These periodic modulations of excitability
can be exploited in order to gate communica-
tion  among  neurons.  By  adjusting  oscillation
frequency and phases of coupled neuronal popu-
lations,  communication  among  those  neurons
can either be facilitated or blocked. To form a
functional network of distributed neurons it suf-
fices to coordinate their  oscillatory activity in
such a way that signals emitted by neurons of
this network impinge on other members of the
network at times when these are highly suscept-
ible to input. One way to achieve this is to en-
train the neurons that should be bound into a
functional network to engage in oscillations of
the same frequency, to synchronize these oscilla-
tions, and to adjust the phases such that neur-
ons that ought to be able to communicate can
communicate. 
Evidence from multi-site recordings indic-
ate that neurons are indeed bound together into
sometimes  widespread  functional  networks
through  synchronization  of  their  oscillatory
activity in a task-dependent way (Salazar et al.
2012; Buschman et al. 2012). This supports the
hypothesis (Gray et al. 1989; Singer 1999; Fries
2005) that synchronization of oscillatory neur-
onal activity is  a versatile  mechanism for  the
temporary  association  of  distributed  neurons
and the binding of their responses into function-
ally coherent assemblies—which as a whole rep-
resent a particular cognitive content. Such a dy-
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namic binding mechanism appears to be an eco-
nomical and highly flexible strategy for coping
with the representations of a virtually unlimited
variety  of  feature  constellations  characterizing
perceptual objects. Taking the unified nature of
conscious experience  and the virtually infinite
diversity of possible contents that can be repres-
ented, the formation of distributed representa-
tions,  through response synchronization,  offers
itself as a mechanism that allows for the encod-
ing of  ever-changing constellations of  contents
in a unifying format.
Synchronization  is  also  ideally  suited  to
contribute to the selection of contents for access
to consciousness. It enhances the saliency of sig-
nals  by  concentrating  spike  discharges  into  a
narrow temporal window. This increases the co-
incidence of  excitatory postsynaptic  potentials
(EPSPs) in target cells that receive input from
synchronized  cell  groups.  Because  coincident
EPSPs  summate  much  more  effectively  than
temporally  dispersed  EPSPs,  synchronized  in-
puts are particularly effective in driving post-
synaptic target cells. It is thus not unexpected
that  entrainment  of  neuronal  populations  in
synchronized gamma oscillation is used for at-
tention-dependent selection of input configura-
tions (Fries et al. 2001b; Fries 2009).
4.5 A prediction relating long-range 
synchronisation to consciousness
If activation patterns that subjects can become
aware  of  are  indeed  characterized  by globally
coherent  states  of  those  cortical  regions  that
process the contents actually appearing as uni-
fied, we expect these states of awareness to be
associated  with  large-scale  synchronization  of
neuronal  activity.  Candidate  frequency  bands
are gamma and beta oscillations, as these have
been shown to serve the temporal coordination
of cortical networks. By contrast, if subjects are
not  aware of  the presented stimulus material,
processing  should  remain  confined  to  smaller
sub-networks, which operate in relative isolation
and  are  not  integrated  into  globally  coherent
states. In this case one should observe only local
synchronization of more circumscribed neuronal
populations (see Varela et al. 2001). 
Finally,  adjustments  of  oscillation  fre-
quency and phases fulfil  the requirement that
assemblies  representing  consciously  processed
contents  need  to  be  reconfigured  at  an  ex-
tremely fast rate.  The contents of  which sub-
jects  are  aware  can  apparently  change  at  a
rapid pace, at least four times a second, if one
considers that this is the frequency with which
the direction of gaze changes during the scan-
ning of natural scenes. Thus, assemblies repres-
enting contents  that  are consciously perceived
must be reconfigurable at similarly fast times-
cales. Evidence suggests that cortical networks
operate in a regime of self-organized criticality
close to the edge of chaos (Shew et al. 2009).
Dynamical systems operating in this range can
undergo  very  rapid  state  changes,  which  are
characterized by shifts in oscillation frequencies,
synchronization, and phase. 
4.6 Methodological caveats in the search 
for the NCC
As discussed previously (Aru et al. 2012a) ex-
periments designed to identify the neuronal cor-
relates of consciousness are often fraught with
ambiguities. The most frequently used strategy
for the identification of NCC is contrastive ana-
lysis.  One  creates  perceptual  conditions  in
which targets are consciously perceived in only
a subset of trials, while making sure that phys-
ical conditions are kept as constant as possible.
This strategy implies that detection tasks have
been designed, which operate close to the per-
ceptual threshold. This can be achieved by re-
ducing the physical energy of the stimuli or by
masking them. While  subjects  are engaged in
such  detection  tasks,  neuronal  responses  are
measured and then trials are sorted depending
on whether the subjects did or did not perceive
the  stimulus.  By  subtracting  the  average  re-
sponses obtained in the two conditions from one
another,  those  neuronal  responses  that  occur
only in the condition of successful detection can
be isolated, and these are then commonly inter-
preted  as  the  neuronal  correlate  of  conscious
perception. This seemingly simple approach is
not without ambiguity. Thus, noise fluctuations
in afferent pathways are likely to lead to signi-
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ficant differences in the available sensory evid-
ence,  especially  because  experiments  are  per-
formed at the perceptual threshold. Therefore,
those aspects of neuronal responses that truly
reflect  NCC may be  contaminated  by  signals
resulting from noise  fluctuations at processing
stages  preceding  those  actually  mediating
awareness. In addition, once subjects have be-
come aware of stimuli,  there are a number of
subsequent processing steps that need not ne-
cessarily be linked to NCC. These comprise the
covert  verbalization  of  stimulus  material,  the
engagement of working memory, the transfer of
information into declarative memory, and per-
haps also  the preparation of  covert  motor re-
sponses. The distinction between these various
confounding factors is difficult because all the
processes are intimately related to each other. A
detailed discussion of this problem is given in
Aru et al. (2012a). One distinguishing feature
could be the latency of the electrographic signa-
tures of  these various processing steps.  Noise-
dependent  fluctuations  in  sensory  evidence
should be manifested early on; responses related
to NCC proper should have some intermediate
latency; and the consequences of having become
aware  of  a  stimulus  should  have  the  longest
latencies. In order to use these latencies as dis-
tinguishing criteria, it is of course required that
we estimate  the  precise  latency  at  which  the
mechanisms leading to conscious perception are
likely to be engaged. Assuming that the time re-
quired to prepare and execute simple motor re-
sponses is generally constant, the interval of in-
terest  can  be  constrained  and  has  been  pro-
posed  as  somewhere  between  180  and  a  few
hundred milliseconds, depending on the sensory
modality  and  the  difficulty  of  the  detection
task.  Attempts to use latency criteria  for the
elimination of confounds is of course restricted
to  electroencephalographic  and  magneto-en-
cephalographic data, and cannot be applied to
results obtained with functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging because of  the limited temporal
resolution of this technique. 
Another option for the reduction of con-
founds is to combine manipulations that influ-
ence  the  conscious  perception  of  a  stimulus
through different  mechanisms and to compare
the electrographic responses between conditions
(Aru et al. 2012b). We applied this strategy in
investigations  of  patients  with  subdurally  im-
planted  recording  electrodes  located  over  the
visual cortex. In one set of trials the visibility of
stimuli, in this case faces, was manipulated by
changing the sensory evidence of the stimulus
material. In another set of trials visibility of the
same  stimuli  was  influenced  by  allowing  the
subjects to familiarize themselves with some of
the  stimuli.  This  also  facilitated  detectability,
but now because of an expectancy-driven top-
down process.  The reasoning  behind this  was
that neuronal responses reflecting NCC proper
should be the same irrespective of whether stim-
uli  are  consciously  perceived  because  of  en-
hanced sensory evidence or because of top-down
facilitation.  As  electrographic  signature  of  in-
terest we analyzed the neuronal activity in the
gamma band. In a previous study (Fisch et al.
2009) had shown that category-specific gamma
band  responses  in  the  visual  cortex  correlate
with  conscious  perception.  Conscious  recogni-
tion  leads  to  a  phasic  enhancement  of  the
gamma-band response, thus supporting the no-
tion  that  conscious  perception  arises  locally
within  sensory cortices—which is  in  line  with
previous conclusions (Zeki 2001;  Malach 2007).
In  our  study  we  found  that  the  performance
and the reports of the subject were clearly mod-
ulated both by changing sensory evidence  and
by prior knowledge of the stimuli, as expected;
but the gamma-band responses solely reflected
the sensory evidence. This suggests that the dif-
ferential activation of specific areas of the visual
cortex,  in  our  case  mainly  the  fusiform  face
area,  reflect  processes  that  prepare  access  to
conscious perception but are not its substrate
proper.
Another frequently used paradigm in the
search for NCC is interocular rivalry. If the two
eyes are presented with stimuli that cannot be
fused into one coherent percept, subjects  per-
ceive only one of the two stimuli at a time, and
these percepts alternate. There are various ways
to label the stimuli presented to the two eyes,
to  trace  the  responses  related  to  their  pro-
cessing  in  the  brain,  and  then  to  see  which
brain structures have to get involved in order to
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support  conscious  perception.  Again,  these
studies  have  led  to inconclusive results.  Some
claim that suppression of signals corresponding
to  the  non-perceived  stimulus  occurs  only  at
very high levels of visual processing, such as, for
example,  the  temporal  cortex,  which  is  the
highest stage of the ventral processing stream.
The conclusion of these studies is that activa-
tion of this particular cortical network is a ne-
cessary  prerequisite  for  conscious  processing
(Logothetis et  al. 1996;  Silver &  Logothetis
2004).  Others,  by  contrast,  found  diverging
activity patterns already existing at the level of
the  thalamus  and  the  primary  visual  cortex
(Haynes et al. 2005;  Fries et al. 1997). Recent
correlations between the dynamics characteriz-
ing binocular rivalry and anatomical features of
the primary visual cortex and the commissures
linking the primary visual cortices of  the two
hemispheres  provide  compelling  evidence  that
the rivalry phenomenon is  based on processes
occurring within V1 (Genc et al. 2014). How-
ever, none of these studies allows us to unam-
biguously locate the processes that lead to con-
scious perception. They only contribute to the
identification of the earliest levels of processing,
in which changes are detectable that correlate
with conscious perception. 
Interesting and of  potential  relevance for
interpretations given in the next subsection is
the observation that the access of sensory sig-
nals to conscious processing does not seem to be
gated by modulation of the neurons’ discharge
rate, but rather by changes of the synchroniza-
tion  of  their  activity—at  least  in  the  early
stages of processing. What matters is the degree
of  synchronicity  of  oscillatory  activity  in  the
gamma  frequency  range.  Signals  conveyed  by
well-synchronized neuronal assemblies have ac-
cess to conscious processing, while signals con-
veyed by similarly active but purely synchron-
ized neurons fail to do so (Fries et al. 2001c). Of
interest in this context is the observation that
stimuli access conscious perception more easily
if they are attended to, and that attention en-
hances synchronization of neuronal responses in
the gamma frequency band in early visual areas
(Fries et al. 2001b). Again, however, this local
increase in synchrony is likely to simply enhance
the saliency of the neuronal responses, facilitat-
ing  their  propagation  across  the  cortical  net-
works, and cannot per se be considered a neur-
onal correlate of consciousness.
4.7 Evidence relating long-range 
synchronization and consciousness
The results described in what follows were ob-
tained  in  a  study  where  we  presented  words
that could be perceived in some trials and not
in others (by adjusting the luminance of mask-
ing stimuli), and simultaneously performed elec-
troencephalographic (EEG) recordings (Melloni
et  al. 2007).  Several  measures  were  analyzed:
Time-resolved  power  changes  of  local  signals;
the precision of phase synchronization across re-
cording sites, and over a wide frequency range;
and  event-related  potentials  (ERPs).  A  brief
burst  of  long-distance  synchronization  in  the
gamma-frequency range between occipital, pari-
etal, and frontal sensors was the first event that
distinguished seen from unseen words at about
180ms poststimulus. In contrast, local synchron-
ization was similar between conditions. Interest-
ingly, after this transient period of synchroniza-
tion,  several  other  measures  differed  between
seen and unseen words: We observed an increase
in amplitude of the P300 ERP for visible words,
which most likely corresponds to the transfer of
information  to  working  memory.  In  addition,
during  the  interval  period—in  which  visible
words had to be maintained in memory—we ob-
served  increases  in  frontal  theta  oscillations.
Theta oscillations have been related to mainten-
ance of items in short-term memory (Jensen &
Tesche 2002; Schack et al. 2005). 
To test whether the increase in long-dis-
tance  synchronization  relates  to  awareness  or
depth of processing, we further manipulated the
depth  of  processing  of  invisible  words.  It  has
previously been shown that invisible words can
be processed up to the semantic and motor level
(Dehaene et al. 1998). In a subliminal semantic
priming experiment we briefly presented words
(which were thus invisible) that were either se-
mantically  related  or  unrelated,  alongside  a
second, visible word on which subjects had to
carry out a semantic classification task. Invis-
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ible words were processed up to semantic levels,
as revealed by modulation of the reaction times,
depending on the congruency between invisible
and  visible  words:  congruent  pairs  exhibited
shorter  reaction  times  than  incongruent  ones.
We observed increases in power in the gamma
frequency range for unseen but processed words.
For visible words we additionally observed in-
creases in long-distance synchronization in the
gamma-frequency range  (Melloni &  Rodriguez
2007). Thus, local processing of stimuli is reflec-
ted in increases in gamma power, whereas long-
distance synchronization seems to be related to
awareness  of  stimuli.  This  suggests  that  con-
scious processing requires a particular dynam-
ical  state  of  the  cortical  network.  The  large-
scale synchronization that we observed in our
study could reflect the transfer of contents into
awareness and/or their maintenance. We favour
the first possibility, given the transient nature
of  the  effect,  and  argue  that  the  subsequent
theta oscillations might support maintenance. It
is  conceivable  that  short  periods  of  long-dis-
tance synchronization in  the gamma band re-
flect  the  update  of  new  contents,  while  the
slower pace of theta oscillations might relate to
sustained integration and maintenance of local
results in the workspace of consciousness. The
interplay  between  these  two  frequency  bands
might underlie  the phenomenon of  continuous
but ever-changing conscious experience (see be-
low). 
More recently,  Gaillard et al. (2009) have
revisited the processing of visible and invisible
words. In intracranial recordings in epileptic pa-
tients,  they  observed  that  invisible  words  eli-
cited activity in multiple cortical areas, which
quickly vanished after 300 ms. In contrast, vis-
ible words elicited sustained voltage changes, in-
creases in power in the gamma band, as well as
long-distance synchronization in the beta band
and long-range Granger causality. In contrast to
our study, Gaillard et al. observed a rather late
(300–500 ms) rise of long-distance synchroniza-
tion. However, it is important to note that in
the study undertaken by Gaillard et al., phase-
synchrony was analyzed for the most part over
electrodes  within  a  given  cortical  area,  or  at
most between hemispheres.  It  is  thus conceiv-
able that earlier synchronization events passed
undetected because of incomplete electrode cov-
erage.  Despite  these  restrictions,  this  study
provides one of the most compelling pieces of
evidence  for  a  relation  between  long-distance
synchronization and consciousness. 
Some results of the experiments on binocu-
lar  rivalry point  in  the same direction.  Several
studies have shown increased synchronization and
phase locking of oscillatory responses to the stim-
ulus  that  was  consciously  perceived,  and  con-
trolled behaviour (Cosmelli et al. 2004; Doesburg
et al. 2005;  Fries et al. 1997;  Srinivasan et al.
1999). Cosmelli et al. (2004) extend the findings
obtained in human subjects by performing source-
reconstruction and analyzing phase-synchrony in
source space. These authors observed that percep-
tual dominance was accompanied by co-activation
of occipital and frontal regions, including the an-
terior  cingulate  and  medial  frontal  areas.  Re-
cently, Doesburg et al. (2009) have provided evid-
ence for a relation between perceptual switches in
binocular  rivalry  and  theta-  and  gamma-band
synchronization. Perceptual switches were related
to increments in long-distance synchronization in
the gamma band between several cortical areas
(frontal and parietal) that repeated at the rate of
theta oscillations. The authors suggest that tran-
sient gamma-band synchronization supports dis-
crete  moments  of  perceptual  experience,  while
theta  oscillations  structure  their  succession  in
time, pacing the formation and dissolution of dis-
tributed  neuronal  assemblies.  Thus,  long-range
gamma synchronization locked to on-going theta
oscillations could serve to structure the flow of
conscious experience, allowing for changes in con-
tent every few hundred milliseconds. Further re-
search  is  required  to  clarify  the  exact  relation
between the two frequency bands, their respective
role in the generation of percepts, and the pacing
of changes in perception.
Another paradigm in consciousness research
exploits the attentional blink phenomenon. When
two stimuli are presented at short intervals among
a set of distractors, subjects usually detect the
first  (S1) but miss the second (S2) when it  is
presented 200–500 ms after S1. Increases in long-
range neuronal synchrony in the beta and gamma
frequency ranges have been observed when the S2
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is  successfully detected (Gross et al. 2004;  Na-
katani et  al. 2005).  Furthermore,  Gross et  al.
(2004) observed that successful detection of both
S1 and S2 was related to increased long-distance
synchronization in the beta range to both stimuli,
and this enhanced synchrony was accompanied by
higher de-synchronization in the inter-stimulus in-
terval. Thus, de-synchronization might have facil-
itated the segregation of the two targets, allowing
for identification of the second stimulus (also see
Rodriguez et al. 1999). Source analysis revealed,
as in the case of binocular rivalry, dynamical co-
ordination between frontal, parietal, and temporal
regions for detected targets (Gross et al. 2004).
In summary, studies of masking, binocular
rivalry, and the attentional blink support the in-
volvement of long-range synchronization in con-
scious perception. Recent investigations have sug-
gested further that a nesting of different frequen-
cies,  in  particular  of  theta and gamma oscilla-
tions, could play a role in pacing the flow of con-
sciousness. Furthermore, the study of Gross et al.
(2004)  suggests  that  de-synchronization  could
serve  to  segregate  representations  when stimuli
follow at short intervals. These results are encour-
aging and should motivate further search for rela-
tions between oscillatory activity in different fre-
quency bands and consciousness, whereby atten-
tion should be focused not only on the formation
of  dynamically-configured networks but also  on
their dissolution.
4.8 Conclusions on putative mechanisms 
supporting consiousness
Of the numerous proposals on NCC, those favour-
ing temporal coherence as the mechanism that in-
tegrates widely distributed processes appear to be
the least controversial. They account best for the
apparent discrepancy between the unity of con-
scious experience and the distributed organization
of the brain, because they allow for the dynamic
integration of information generated in parallel by
spatially  segregated  processing  modules.  Large-
scale  synchronization  of  oscillatory  activity  has
been identified as a candidate mechanism for the
flexible  coupling  of  widely-distributed  neuron
populations,  and  hence  as  a  likely  NCC.  This
variable has the advantage that it can be meas-
ured relatively directly in humans who are able to
give  detailed  descriptions  about their  conscious
experience.  However,  oscillations and synchrony
seem to be mechanisms that are as intimately and
inseparably related to neuronal processing in gen-
eral  as  the  modulation  of  neuronal  discharge
rates.  Thus,  without  further  specification  these
phenomena cannot stand up as NCC—at least
when we disregard the triviality that conscious-
ness  does not  exist  without them. We propose
that the spatial scale and the precision and stabil-
ity of neuronal synchrony might be taken as more
specific indicators of whether the communication
of  information  in  the brain is  accompanied  by
conscious experience or not. In this framework,
conscious  experience  arises  only  if  information
that is widely distributed within or across subsys-
tems is not only processed and passed on to exec-
utive structures but also bound together into a
coherent, all-encompassing, non-local but distrib-
uted  meta-representation.  This  interpretation  is
compatible with views that take consciousness to
be the result of the dynamic interplay of brain
subsystems;  one  that  allows  for  a  rapid  and
highly-flexible integration of information provided
by the numerous distributed subsystems that op-
erate in parallel. This view resembles a proposal
from Sherrington, formulated in his book The In-
tegrative Action of the Nervous System (Sherring-
ton 1906): “[p]ure conjunction in time without ne-
cessarily cerebral conjunction in space lies at the
root of the solution of the problem of the unity of
mind.” The additive value of conscious processing
would then be the possibility of establishing in a
unified  data  format  ever-changing  relations
between  cognitive  contents—irrespective  of
whether they are read out from memory or in-
duced by sensory signals, and irrespective of the
sensory modality providing the signals. By virtue
of this dynamic definition of novel relations, non-
local  meta-representations  of  specific  constella-
tions could be established that have the status of
cognitive objects. Just as with any other distrib-
uted representation of contents, these could then
be stored as distributed engrams by use-depend-
ant  modification  of  synaptic  connections,  and
thus influence future behaviour. Thus, conscious
processing would differ from non-conscious pro-
cessing because it allows for the versatile binding
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of the previously unbound into higher-order rep-
resentations.  And  if  so,  “conscious”  processing
would be functionally relevant and not merely an
epiphenomenon.  Further  arguments  supporting
the  functional  role  of  conscious  processing  are
presented in the following section.
5 Arguments supporting an adaptive 
value of conscious processing
5.1 Evolutionary considerations
Given the continuity of evolution and the gradual
increase in complexity of brains that reached a
(perhaps  preliminary)  maximum in  human be-
ings, it appears likely that the ability to be aware
of cognitive contents, of one’s own cognitive oper-
ations,  and  finally  of  oneself  as  an  intentional
agent, is not an all-or-none phenomenon but an
ability that gradually emerged as we evolved. Pa-
leoanthropological  evidence  supports  this  hypo-
thesis  by documenting  correlations  between in-
creasing  brain  volume  and  increasingly  refined
artefacts that reflect gradual increases in cognit-
ive abilities. Not much direct data are available
on the evolution of the human brain, because our
immediate  ancestors  are  all  extinct.  Thus,  we
have to rely on evidence of comparative studies
with brains of other species. In less evolved brains
the paths from sensory to executive areas of the
cerebral cortex are short. These relatively short
sensory-motor  loops  are  of  course  much  more
elaborate than simple reflex loops, because signals
are  processed  extensively  and  transmission  is
made conditional on input from other systems, on
past  experience,  and  on  context.  As  evolution
proceeds and brains become more and more com-
plex, one observes the addition of new cortical
areas. A distinctive feature of this evolutionary
process is the way in which these new areas are
embedded  in  already-existing  networks.  These
newly-added  areas  no  longer  communicate  dir-
ectly with the periphery, neither on the executive
nor on the receptive side (see  figure 3). Instead
they  receive  their  input  exclusively  from  the
phylogenetically older areas,  and also distribute
their computational results solely to other cortical
areas and not to effector systems. This process is
iterative,  with more and more areas constantly
added that communicate only with other higher
areas.  A  neuron  located  in  these  more  recent
areas is connected exclusively with other partners
in the cerebral cortex. Evidence indicates that all
cortical  areas,  including  older  and more  recent
ones, operate according to the same basic prin-
ciples, because they share the same intrinsic or-
ganization.  These  purely  anatomical  considera-
tions suggest that the evolutionary-recent areas
process the results of the older areas similarly to
how they process signals from the outer world.
This iteration of “cognitive” processes across sev-
eral hierarchical levels could thus generate repres-
entations of representations, i.e., meta-representa-
tions.  Information  that  has  already  been  pro-
cessed by the already existing areas becomes the
object of yet another cortical computation, i.e., of
a secondary cognitive operation. These iterative
operations can even be circular, because all these
areas  are  interconnected  reciprocally.  Thus,
higher-order areas feed back to lower, order areas
and can have their results reprocessed. In prin-
ciple this recursive process should permit the gen-
eration  of  meta-representations  of  increasingly
higher  order.  In  other  words,  highly  evolved
brains  can  apply  their  cognitive  functions  not
only to the outer world but also to processes that
occur within the brain. Brain processes can there-
fore become the object of the brain’s own cognit-
ive operations. This could be the basis of phe-
nomenal awareness, the awareness of perceiving,
to create a protocol for what one perceives, and
in the case of human beings to create symbols for
the perceived and for internal states and to com-
municate them to others. Animals probably share
some of these abilities, because their brains are
organized in a very similar way. 
Curiously, the ability to be aware of the res-
ults of cognitive opertions provides no clue con-
cerning  the  computational  processes  underlying
these cognitive functions. We have no insight into
the neuronal  processes  that  bring about cogni-
tion. We are aware only of the results—just as we
are aware of an action without being able to tell
which neuronal processes in the motor centers of
our brains caused this action. This fact is at the
origin  of  most  discrepancies  between  our  intu-
itions and neurobiological evidence concerning the
nature of agency, the experience of Free Will, and
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the ontological status of qualia and consciousness
(see final paragraph).
These  evolutionary  considerations  may
provide some plausible explanation of the emer-
gence  of  higher  cognitive  functions—including
consciousness—but  they  do  not  suffice  to
counter  the  argument  that  the  emergence  of
consciousness is an epiphenomenon without ad-
aptive value. To address this problem, one must
identify functions that can only be realized by
conscious processing.
Figure 3: The evolution of complex brains is characterized
by a massive increase of  cortical  areas.  This renders  re-
sponses to stimuli increasingly dependent on intracerebral
processes and permits generation of meta-representations.
5.2 Functional considerations
Is the ability to be conscious of one’s own cog-
nitive operations a fitness factor? And would it
make any difference if brains lacked this ability?
The philosopher of mind, David Chalmers, once
stated: “[n]o, that wouldn’t make a difference.
It’s just an epiphenomenon and if we wouldn’t
have it we would do as well because the under-
lying brain processes would be the same and get
us through life without us having to be aware of
them.” I tend to disagree with this view for a
number of reasons. The common denominator,
however, is that there is something very special
about  the  nature  of  conscious  processes,  and
that  this  uniqueness  does  indeed  constitute  a
fitness factor—in particular with respect to the
ability to develop symbolic communication sys-
tems, a theory of mind, differentiated social sys-
tems, and, ultimately, culture.
As has been argued above, conscious pro-
cessing allows for abstraction and symbolic rep-
resentations due to its versatile binding of virtu-
ally all  results of lower order cognitive opera-
tions in a unified representational space, capit-
alizing on the lingua franca (the homogeneous
data format) of communication among cortical
areas. This permits implementation of very ef-
fective—we  call  them  rational—strategies  for
deliberation  and  decision-making  that  differ
from  and  complement  those  of  subconscious
processes.  The question then remains whether
the results of these special processes affect brain
functions and thereby affect behaviour.
It is difficult to see how the outcome of a
conscious deliberation, that is, of an argument-
based  decision,  could  not  affect  future  beha-
viour. A conscious decision leaves traces in de-
clarative memory and so must the consequences
of this decision. These traces are inscribed as
modifications  of  the functional  architecture of
the respective networks. If a decision has averse
or  beneficial  consequences,  the  experience  of
these consequences will also alter network prop-
erties, and the novel activation patterns gener-
ated by the modified networks will enter as a
novel argument, or as a change of goal in future
deliberations.  Eventually,  the  newly-set  goal,
which initially had the status of a conscious ra-
tional argument, may change its status and be-
come a habit that henceforth influences beha-
viour without having to appear as an explicit
argument in consciousness. It can become one of
Singer, W. (2015). The Ongoing Search for the Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 36(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570344 22 | 30
www.open-mind.net
the variables that act at a subconscious level.
One then refuses another glass of wine not be-
cause  one  recapitulates  all  the  rational  argu-
ments against alcohol consumption but simply
because it does not feel right to drink too much.
Another,  and probably the most import-
ant fitness factor of conscious processing is its
capacity  to  support  complex  societies  in  cul-
tural  evolution.  This  suggests  that  there  may
have  been  a  co-evolution  of  mechanisms  sup-
porting  the  emergence  of  conscious  behaviour
on the one hand and the formation of societies
on the other, with the two developments mutu-
ally supporting each other.
Cognitive objects represented in conscious-
ness are always bound together into a coherent
experience.  Whether  this  is  also  the  case  for
subconsciously-processed  contents  is  obviously
difficult  to  ascertain,  but  the  following  argu-
ment suggests that subconscious processing may
be less integrated, more modulary, and confined
to  subsystems.  We  subconsciously  orient  to-
wards salient stimuli irrespective of their modal-
ity,  visual,  auditory,  or  tactile  qualities,  and
these stimuli  may be analyzed in the subcon-
scious with respect to their  behavioural relev-
ance and thus give rise to action. However, if
several stimuli compete for processing, usually
the most salient will win. Compared to orient-
ing  responses,  which  are  guided  by  conscious
processing, there seems to be little evaluation of
the  embedding  context  here.  Stimuli  are  pro-
cessed  more  independently  than  they  would
have been had they entered consciousness, been
bound together, and formed a unified coherent
percept.
In order to achieve this integration and to
relate the signals from various sensory systems
to one another at the semantic level, the signals
have  to  be  encoded  in  a  sufficiently  abstract
and homogenous format. As mentioned above,
when describing brain evolution, the substrate
for  this  integration of  signals  preprocessed by
segregated sensory systems may be the evolu-
tionary-recent cortical areas. By virtue of integ-
rating  and  comparing  signals  from  different
modalities,  it  becomes  possible  to  detect  the
similar in the seemingly different, and hence to
extract invariant properties and to arrive at ab-
stract  descriptions.  Thus  the  addition  of  the
novel, so called “association areas” of the neo-
cortex prepared the ground not only for a more
unified,  polymodal  representation  of  cognitive
contents but also for symbolic coding—which in
turn is a prerequisite for the development of a
symbolic language system and abstract reason-
ing. Thus one might consider consciousness, or
the  state  of  conscious  processing,  as  a  state
where distributed computational results can be
bound together into a coherent whole, establish-
ing multiple, simultaneous relations between the
various distributed items. This obviously allows
for a more abstract, more symbolic, and more
comprehensive description of conditions. By it-
self  this  is  an  advanced  processing  strategy,
whose adaptive or fitness value is obvious. How-
ever, if this unified, condensed, and abstract in-
formation can be routed to a versatile commu-
nication system, as seems to be the case with
contents  that  are  processed  consciously,  the
evolution of cooperating societies will be greatly
facilitated. Not only will it be easier to commu-
nicate what one has perceived if the numerous
signals  from different  sensory  modalities  have
already  been  bound  together  into  coherent
wholes but, because of the reflexive nature of
awareness,  it will  also be easier to convey in-
formation  about  one’s  internal  state.  This,  in
turn,  is  an important  prerequisite for  society-
building, because it nurtures trust in and pre-
dictability of the respective other. A condensed
report of the actual contents of one’s conscious
state and its storage in the episodic memory of
the  listener  is  an  effective  and  parsimoneous
way to couple brains with one another, to share
experiences, and to foster cooperation. This in-
teraction will modify the brains of the commu-
nicating partners and thereby act on their beha-
viour. In a sense this is an example of mental or
top-down causation. The results of an informa-
tion-processing strategy that can only be real-
ized  in  the  workspace  of  consciousness  are
stored in declarative memory—in this case not
only in a single brain but in those of communic-
ating partners—and henceforth influence future
cognitive processes  and behaviour.  These con-
siderations suggest that it might be useful and
perhaps  even  necessary  in  consciousness  re-
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search to consider  the phenomena ascribed to
consciousness not solely in the context of cog-
nitive functions of individual brains but in the
larger context of social interactions. In the fol-
lowing section this strategy is applied in an at-
tempt to approach the “hard problem of con-
sciousness”.
6 Consciousness as a social phenomenon
6.1 Is the hard problem resolvable by 
considering cultural rather than only 
biological evolution?
The  hard  problem  in  consciousness  research,
the  epistemic  difficulty  of  devising  bridging
theories  between  subjective  phenomena  avail-
able  only from a first-person perspective and
the  underlying  neuronal  mechanisms  analyz-
able  only  from  the  third-person  perspective,
may not be resolvable by considering only the
cognitive  abilities  of  isolated  brains.  In addi-
tion, more recent concepts of embodiment that
consider the embedding of the nervous system
in a body endowed with receptor and effector
organs may not suffice. Rather, it may be ne-
cessary to reconsider the problem in the con-
text of social phenomena or social realities that
emerged during cultural evolution. Through so-
cial  interactions,  realities  have  been  created
that  can  readily  be  experienced  as  such  but
that transcend the reality that existed before
humans added cultural to biological evolution.
These  new realities  have  the  quality  of  rela-
tions.  They are immaterial,  not tangible,  not
visible, not directly accessible to our senses—
and yet they are perceived as real, as mental
objects that humans can agree upon, that can
become the object of shared attention and in-
fluence behaviour—just like the equally imma-
terial contents of belief systems. 
What seems to pose the epistemic—the
hard—problem in philosophy of mind is not so
much that we perceive and have feelings and
emotions, since we readily grant such abilities
to animals and seem to be quite successful in
identifying  the  neuronal  substrate  of  these
functions. The real problem appears to be our
meta-awareness of having these abilities. It is
this meta-awareness that has mental connota-
tions that appear to be so difficult to relate to
neuronal processes. However, this meta-aware-
ness—which is so intimately related with what
we address when we talk about consciousness
—in all likelihood does not emerge naturally
from  the  functions  of  an  individual  brain.
Rather,  it  appears  to  be  the  consequence  of
experiences resulting from social interactions,
just as is the case for the experience of indi-
viduality, agency, and intentionality. These are
attributions that have their roots in interper-
sonal interactions and are probably appropri-
ated by individuals while they are developping
their self-image. Without being embedded in a
differentiated  socio-cultural  environment,
without the option of mirroring oneself in the
perception of others, without reflexive interac-
tions between persons endowed with a theory
of mind, and without an exchange of reports
about inner states,  formulated in a symbolic
language-system,  we  would  probably  not  be
aware of our being conscious.
Thus  the  phenomenon that  we call  con-
sciousness has the ontological status of a social
reality. It is a construct, just like all the other
social  realities  that our cultures  have brought
into this world. However, this construct differs
in an important respect from other social realit-
ies, such as norms, beliefs, and values, in that it
is an attribution that we ascribe to ourselves.
We learn from social  interactions that we are
endowed with the ability to be aware of being
aware. After conceptualization of this novel ex-
perience it becomes an integral part of our self-
image—we exchange reports on this shared ex-
perience and coin words for it. 
Regarded in this way the “hard problem”
may not be as hard as it seems. Analyzing in-
dividual  brains  will  not  unravel  the  “correl-
ates”  of  the  many  semantic  connotations  of
what  we  term  consciousness,  because  they
emerged from a reflexive  interaction  between
individuals. But we should eventually be able
to identify the neuronal mechanisms underly-
ing the cognitive abilities that allowed human
beings  to  create  the  socio-cultural  environ-
ment that itself allowed for the experience of
being conscious. 
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7 Culture-specific, epigenetic shaping of 
brains and the concept of tolerance
As suggested in the preceding section, inclusion
of the social dimension may be indispensible for
defining the status of higher cognitive functions
such as consciousness. But it may also help us
to bridge gaps between naturalistic approaches
and first-person phenomenology. Thus, surpris-
ingly, the joint consideration of neurobiological
evidence on the dependence of perception of pri-
ors and of the epigenetic modification of priors
by  socio-cultural  factors  has  normative  con-
sequences for concepts of tolerance.
Human beings have a similar genetic out-
fit,  and therefore  usually  agree  on what they
perceive—in particular  when priors  suffice  for
the interpretation of the perceived, which had
been acquired during evolution in a pre-cultural
world. However, this may not apply to the per-
ception of social realities. Humans raised in dif-
ferent  cultures  may  perceive  social  realities
quite  differently.  Cultures  may differ  radically
with  respect  to  social  conditions,  concepts  of
fairness, justice, and aesthetics, as well as moral
criteria,  and  so  on.  Thus,  epigenetically-in-
stalled priors are likely to exhibit considerable
culture-specific  differences.  As  a  consequence,
the ways in which the world is  perceived will
also  differ.  Another  culture  specific  variable
likely to influence perception is the attachment
to caretakers. The nature of early bonding ex-
periences determines whether the world appears
as  hostile  or  as  peaceful  and  secure,  and
whether others can be approached with confid-
ence  or  scepticism.  The  ways  in  which  these
early attachments to other members are secured
differ  dramatically  among  different  cultures
and, as such, so will the perception of signals
that  inspire  confidence  or  aggression.  Since
these  early-acquired  priors  are  implicit,  and
since one is unaware that perceptions are influ-
enced by these early imprinting processes, hu-
man beings take what they perceive as “real”
and see no reason to question its validity. Thus,
two persons raised differently,  while  observing
the  same  social  situation  may  perceive  it  in
completely different ways.  They may come to
grossly  diverging  ethical  or  moral  judgments,
unable to convince the other through argument
that he or she is wrong, because both experi-
ence  what  they experience  as  reality—just  as
one  experiences  optical  illusions  as  real.  The
problem is that, in the case of the perception of
social realities, there are no “objective” measur-
ing devices. There are different perceptions, and
there is no right or wrong. This has far-reaching
consequences  for  our  concepts  of  tolerance.
Solving  such  problems  with  majority  votes  is
clearly not a fair solution. Assuming that one’s
own position is correct and granting others the
right  to  retain  their  “wrong”  perceptions—so
long as they do not disturb the peace—is humi-
liating and denies them respect. Still, this is of-
ten considered to be tolerant behaviour. What
should be done, instead, is to grant everybody
that her or his perceptions are correct and to
postulate  that  this  attitude  be  reciprocated.
Only if this agreement on reciprocity is violated
have the  dissenting  parties  the  right  to  exert
sanctions. 
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper only a selection of concepts cur-
rently under discussion in the field of cognitive
neuroscience  could  be  reviewed in  any  detail.
The selection criterion was their relatedness to
consciousness studies and to some extent their
relevance for epistemic issues.  This led to the
neglect  of  important  domains,  some of  which
have equally relevant bearing on philosophical
questions and societal issues. Thus, no consider-
ation was given to developmental aspects that
illustrate the close correlation between the mat-
uration of  particular  brain structures  and the
emergence of specific cognitive and social func-
tions. Equally neglected were research on exec-
utive functions and associated concepts on in-
tentionality, agency, mental causation, and free
will. No attempts were made to explore the vast
field  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  genuinely
“psychic” phenomena, such as memories, emo-
tions, motivations, drives, and aesthetic judge-
ment.  Finally,  a  much  more  elaborate  review
would have been required of research that ana-
lyzes brain functions that can only be assessed
in conditions where brains interact with one an-
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other in a social context. This is the domain of
the relatively recent field of social neuroscience,
which  studies  phenomena  such  as  confidence,
greed, generosity, fairness, parasitism, altruism,
compassion,  and collective  beliefs.  This  would
have been particularly important in view of the
attempt made at the end of this contribution to
demystify some of the immaterial connotations
of  consciousness,  in  particular  by  redefining
some aspects  of  consciousness  as belonging to
the domain of social realities, i.e., as a relational
construct emerging from reciprocal interactions
among brains endowed with the cognitive abilit-
ies  of  humans.  The research agendas of  these
“neglected” fields are the same as those of the
domains reviewed above.  They all  attempt to
identify the neuronal mechanisms that are re-
sponsible for a particular cognitive or executive
function, such that it becomes less and less im-
portant whether a cognitive phenomenon is ac-
cessible from the third-person perspective—such
as  the  orienting  behaviour  of  an  animal—or
whether it is accessible only from the first-per-
son perspective—such as in the famous example
of the hue of a rose or an emotion. As long as
these qualia  can be operationalized and rated
on some subjective scale, they are amenable to
neuroscientific  inquiry.  In  case  of  the  social
neurosciences, the agenda is somewhat enlarged,
since the objects of studies are phenomena that
emerge from social interactions and exist as re-
lational constructs only in interpersonal space.
Here the objects of study are the mechanisms
underlying the cognitive functions enabling the
respective  social  interactions  such  as,  for  ex-
ample, the ability to have a theory of mind and
the mechanisms that  permit  individual  brains
to represent social realities. This agenda of the
neurosciences  may  appear  bold  and,  as  the
reader will have noticed, while we already know
much  about  the  component  functions  in  our
brains, we are still very far from understanding
the distributive processes underlying higher cog-
nitive and executive functions. In fact, the more
data that sophisticated analytical tools allow us
to accumulate, the more we are humbled by the
mind-boggling and no longer intuitively grasp-
able complexity of the brain’s dynamics. How-
ever, at least the author and probably the ma-
jority of his colleagues believe that there should
be no principle epistemological barriers to the
pursuit  of  this  research  agenda.  The  greatest
problem in the near future will be that the de-
scription of the dynamics of neuronal processes
underlying higher functions will take the form
of abstract mathematical formulations that lack
any resemblance to the experienced or observed
result of these functions.
Nevertheless, the naturalistic stance taken
by the neurosciences has already in these early
days  provided  some  insights,  whose  relevance
goes beyond the research agenda of the neuros-
ciences proper. The data on mechanisms medi-
ating perception discussed at the beginning of
this chapter clearly support constructivism and
thereby provide arguments for or against partic-
ular philosophical positions. Likewise, these epi-
stemic considerations, to the author’s surprise,
led to normative consequences in the context of
notions  of  tolerance.  Similar  normative  con-
sequences  arise  from data  on  mechanisms  re-
sponsible  for  decision-making,  motivation,  re-
sponse  suppression,  conscious  versus  subcon-
scious processing, personality traits, and so on,
as  these  insights  are all  consequential  for  the
definition of behavioural norms and the distinc-
tion  between  normal  and  pathological  beha-
viour. It is foreseeable, therefore, that the neur-
osciences  will  become more  involved  in  philo-
sophical, normative, ethical, and societal issues.
This  should  be  beneficial  for  all  parties  in-
volved,  since  the  communication  process  is
likely to lead to bridging theories, new terms for
mutual understanding, and amendments to dis-
cipline-specific idiosyncrasies. 
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